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This article argues that Meinong’s analysis of assumption, while exploring the 
variety of phenomenological primitives in a more promising way than Brentano 
did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for (i) the noncommittal character 
of assumptive attitudes and (ii) the difference between assumptive and other 
neighbouring attitudes. Section 1 outlines an overall framework for the 
philosophical analysis of assumptions and cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives 
an overview of Brentano’s analysis of cognitive attitudes and some difficulties 
thereof. Section 3 offers a critical examination of Meinong’s rival analysis. 
Eventually, Section 4 suggests an alternative route, according to which 
assumptive attitudes are best analysed in taking entertaining that p as a 





It is sometimes held that cognitive states – believing, thinking, understanding, 
and the like – exhibit a kind of proprietary and distinctive phenomenology, that 
there is “something it is like” to be in a cognitive state or to undergo a cognitive 
experience. Over the two last decades or so, this claim has been subject to 
lively discussions. Typical cases at issue involve what it is like to understand the 
meaning of a spoken or written sentence (as opposed to merely hearing or 
reading the sentence without understanding it), or what it is like to know that a 
proposition is true. Part of the debate evolves around the alleged cogency of pro 
and con arguments regarding the existence and reducibility of cognitive 
phenomenology. Taking for granted that there is something it is like to 
understand a sentence, is the understanding experience (say) reducible to an 
auditory experience plus some kind of mental imagery and/or emotional 
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ingredient?1 At the same time, the question as to what exactly is the character of 
cognitive experiences and how to give the best description thereof became a 
hot spot again after a period of neglect.2 
Both aspects of the debate have historical antecedents. On the one hand, the 
question concerning the existence and irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology 
is not unlike the old controversy on “imageless thoughts”.3 On the other, the 
question concerning the character of cognitive experiences is not alien to the 
phenomenological analyses offered by Brentano and his students. Even though 
their considerations on judgemental acts are not conducted in terms of 
phenomenal character, there are reasons to think that classical 
phenomenologists in the Brentanian tradition simply take it for granted that there 
is (what is called today) a distinctive phenomenology of judging and 
neighbouring cognitive attitudes.4 At stake for Brentano and his followers simply 
is the description of the phenomenological character of subjective experiences, 
broadly understood. 
This paper locates Meinong’s theory of assumptions within the theoretical 
space opened up by the systematic description of cognitive experiences. More 
pointedly, it focuses on the character of assumptive attitudes. The chief issue is 
how to best describe assumptive attitudes. I argue that Meinong’s analysis of 
assumption, while exploring the variety of phenomenological primitives (affirming 
that p as distinct from believing that p) in a more promising way than Brentano 
did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for (i) the noncommittal character 
of assumptive attitudes and (ii) the difference between assumptive and other 
neighbouring attitudes. My plan is as follows. Section 1 outlines an overall 
framework for the philosophical analysis of cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives 
an overview of Brentano’s analysis and some difficulties thereof. Section 3 offers 
a critical examination of Meinong’s competing view. And Section 4 suggests an 
alternative route, according to which assumptive attitudes are best analysed in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Bayne / Montague eds. 2014. 
2 See Breyer / Gutland eds. 2015. 
3 Dewalque 2017. 
4 See, e.g., Smith 2015, p. 64: “In the phenomenological tradition, since Brentano and 
Husserl, it seems widely assumed that every conscious experience has a distinctive type 
of phenomenal or phenomenological character.” The reason it is so probably has to do 
with the fact that, for Brentano and Husserl, intentionality and phenomenality are not 
disconnected from one another (Kriegel 2013b, p. 2). Yet, I won’t say more about that 
here. 
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1. In Search for Phenomenological Primitives 
 
In this first section I want to suggest that Brentano’s and Meinong’s analyses of 
cognitive attitudes are best understood as part and parcel of an overall research 
programme which aims at discovering phenomenologically primitive notions – or 
phenomenological primitives for short. This programme rests upon a number of 
background claims. What follows is an attempt to make those claims explicit 
and to formulate them in a way that fits the present-day research situation. 
First, Brentano’s theory of judgement and Meinong’s theory of assumption 
take place within the framework of a “descriptive analysis” of mental 
phenomena.5 Their approach to cognitive attitudes is phenomenological in the 
sense that it aims at capturing distinctions that are phenomenally manifest to the 
subject. It is descriptive in the sense that it purports to answer questions of the 
form What is P? And it is analytic in the sense that answering such questions 
requires one to paraphrase or recast some notions in terms of others. 
Historically speaking, this combination of phenomenological description and 
conceptual analysis is at the heart of Brentano’s programme.6 
Second, central to this programme is the claim that phenomenal distinctions 
are not exhausted by distinct ways of representing the world, or “contentual 
distinctions.” They first and foremost involve attitudinal distinctions. Brentano 
and Marty emphatically insist that any satisfying description of mental 
phenomena has to deal with distinct “relational modes of the soul” 
(Beziehungsweise der Seele) or distinct “modes of the intentional relation” (Modi 
der intentionalen Beziehung).7 The basic assumption is that (i) there are different 
attitudes toward the same object represented in the same way, and (ii) those 
attitudes are phenomenally manifest to the subject. For example, believing that 
today will be a sunny day differs from hoping that today will be a sunny day, and 
this attitudinal difference is taken to be phenomenally manifest to the subject. If 
an interpretation of Brentano and Meinong along those lines is correct, then it is 
probably not unfair to say that their respective analyses of cognitive attitudes 
aim at capturing what is sometimes called today the phenomenology of attitude 
type.8 
Third, what are cognitive attitudes? According to a prima facie negative 
characterisation, cognitive attitudes are mental attitudes which are neither 
sensory nor algedonic (pain/pleasure) nor emotional.9 Most of the time, cognitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See., e.g., Brentano 1995a. 
6 See, e.g., Dewalque 2014; Röck 2017. 
7 See, e.g., Marty 1906. 
8 Horgan / Tienson 2002, 522–23. 
9 See, e.g., Twardowski 2014, p. 134: “‘Thinking’ in the broader sense encompasses all 
mental functions and activities, without exception, which do not belong to the sphere of 
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attitudes may be constructed as attitudes towards a proposition p, or 
propositional attitudes. Yet, the question as to whether every cognitive attitude 
is propositional cannot be settled a priori and should be left unanswered at the 
outset. For the sake of convenience, however,  I’ll stick in this article to 
propositional constructions of the form “ϕ-ing that p.” A list of cognitive 
attitudes would include (but would not be limited to) the following: thinking that 
p, believing that p, judging that p, entertaining that p, supposing that p, knowing 
that p, suspecting that p, wondering whether p, doubting that p, etc. 
Fourth, I take it that the analytic description of such cognitive attitudes 
essentially is a matter of how the relevant notions are connected with each 
other. One basic assumption behind this research programme is that mental 
verbs like those forming the aforementioned list make up a web of 
interconnected notions. These notions are interconnected in the sense that 
some of them are likely to be descriptively analysed in terms of some others. 
This is where the concept of phenomenological primitive enters the picture. A 
phenomenological primitive is a notion which is part of the understanding of 
another, less fundamental notion, and which cannot in turn be understood in 
terms of other, more fundamental notions. In sum, phenomenological primitives 
(i) do not admit of any further descriptive analysis – i.e., cannot be paraphrased 
– and (ii) have a phenomenal import in the sense that they capture a property P 
whose presence or absence is phenomenally manifest to the subject. At stake is 
not only the number of primitives that are needed in order to account for 
cognitive attitudes, but also the nature thereof and their place in our overall web 
of phenomenal attitudinal notions. Reduced cognitive attitudes may be said to 
be grounded on more basic notions and, ultimately, on phenomenological 
primitives.10 Much of what I have to say in this article will be dedicated to the 
exploration of such grounding connections. 
However sketchy, those indications suffice when it comes to get a grip on 
what is involved in the philosophical project of describing cognitive attitudes. At 
first sight, the agenda for this research programme is to answer these two 
questions: 
 
Q1  In virtue of what are cognitive attitudes distinguished from one another? 
Q2  Which cognitive notions are derived, and which are conceptually primitive? 
 
In my view, Meinong’s theory of assumptions may be seen as a pioneering 
contribution to this research programme. Yet, since Meinong’s classification of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perception, or to the emotional-volitional sphere, regardless of whether thinking is 
concrete or abstract.” 
10 For a similar view, see Kriegel 2015b. 
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mental phenomena is a critical continuation of Brentano’s, I think it advisable to 
start with a brief examination of Brentano’s own list of phenomenological 
primitives. This is the business of the next section. 
 
 
2. Brentanian Primitives 
 
In the 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (hereafter PES), Brentano 
wants to offer a “natural classification” or taxonomy of mental phenomena. This 
taxonomy “must unite into a single class objects closely related by nature, and it 
must separate into different classes objects which are relatively distant by 
nature”.11 
It is common knowledge that, on Brentano’s view, the most adequate 
classification of mental phenomena is into presentations, judgements, and love-
and-hate phenomena. This tripartite classification shows a number of interesting 
characteristics. To begin with, it may be said to be purely psychological, in the 
sense that it is based on (what Brentano takes to be) intrinsic features of mental 
phenomena rather than extrinsic factors. Now in PES Brentano holds that each 
type of mental phenomenon has its own, intrinsic way of being intentionally 
related to something. One way of capturing this idea is to say that, while all 
mental phenomena are intentional, each fundamental class of mental 
phenomena is characterised by an “entirely new” mode of intentionality.12 To 
give but a trivial example, suppose you think of your favourite ice cream flavour, 
which happens to be Raspberry Ripple, and then come to judge that Raspberry 
Ripple is your favourite ice cream flavour. Brentano would say that, when 
moving from thinking of (understood as a nominal and noncommittal attitude) to 
judging that (which is committal), you experience an entirely new attitude 
towards the content of your mental act, to the effect that your favourite ice 
cream flavour is not only presented but judged about. By contrast with 
presentations, judgements are committal attitudes. Now an analogous change of 
intentional attitude occurs, Brentano would go on, when you do not only judge 
that Raspberry Ripple is your favourite ice cream flavour but also feel an interest 
for it and desire to eat it. In respect to presentation and judgement, interest is an 
entirely new way of being intentionally related to something. Feeling an interest 
for something is committal, too, but not in the same sense as judging: It is a 
different attitude altogether. In sum, Brentano’s classification is attitudinal. As 
George Stout aptly remarks, “differences in the nature of the object are from this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Brentano 1995b, p. 194. I have examined the “natural” character of Brentano’s 
classification elsewhere. See Dewalque 2018 (on which the three following paragraphs 
are based). 
12 See, e.g., Brentano 1995b, 201, etc. 
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point of view irrelevant. Only the attitude or posture of consciousness towards 
objects is to be taken into account”.13 
A second interesting aspect of Brentano’s classification is that his three 
classes are ordered in virtue of one-sided dependence relations obtaining 
between the related phenomena. Presentations somehow underlie all mental 
phenomena, while judgements presuppose presentations and interests 
presuppose presentations and judgements. True, in 1874, Brentano holds the 
view that emotions or interests are all-pervading in human mental life. 
Presentations, most of the time if not always, arouse a judgemental and 
emotional response; they are only a “part” of more complicated mental 
phenomena. Still, Brentano would argue, it is not impossible for you to have a 
presentation of a Raspberry Ripple ice cream without judging anything about it, 
whereas it is impossible for you to judge that Raspberry Ripple is your favourite 
ice cream flavour without thinking of it or having a presentation of it. By analogy, 
while it is not impossible to judge that something is the case without 
experiencing any interest or emotion, it is impossible to experience an interest 
for something without judging that something is the case. 
A third aspect of Brentano’s classification as that it is conceived of as being 
complete. However lush one’s mental life may be, Brentano argues that, as far 
as modes of intentionality are concerned, all mental phenomena may be 
accounted for in terms of presentations, judgements, interests, and 
combinations thereof. Admittedly, some further distinctions are fairly important, 
too. Think, for example, of the distinctions between affirmative and negative 
judgements, self-evident and blind judgements, direct and oblique 
presentations, love and preference, etc. However, as far as such distinctions 
correspond to subspecies of the above-mentioned mental species, Brentano 
takes them to be “non-fundamental”.14 The reason why presentations, 
judgements, and interests exhaust the number of fundamental classes is that 
mental phenomena, in Brentano’s view, exhibit “no more and no less than a 
threefold fundamental difference in their reference to a content”.15 
Now my present concern is not with Brentano’s classification, but with the 
conceptual relations he advocates when describing judgemental and 
presentational attitudes.16 Importantly, it is worth emphasising that the notions of 
judgement and presentation are not phenomenologically primitive. Brentano 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Stout 1896, p. 40. 
14 See Kriegel 2017, p. 100–101. 
15 Brentano 1995b, p. 264; my emphasis. 
16 Although presentational attitudes cannot be said to be cognitive in the strict sense of 
the term, since they are not properly concerned with truth and falsity, I shall include 
them into the picture, for Brentano maintains that they ground judgemental and 
understanding attitudes, which clearly have a cognitive import. 
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uses the notion of “judgement” whenever something is acknowledged as correct 
or rejected as incorrect, which suggests that the primitives at play here are 
accepting (or acknowledging) and rejecting. And he uses the notion of 
“presentation” (Vorstellung) whenever something “appears” to the subject in the 
broadest sense of the term or is merely “given in consciousness” without there 
being any judgemental or emotional attitude involved.17 In other words, 
everything one is aware of may be said to be presented in Brentano’s sense. 
This suggests that the primitive notion here is that of being aware of something 
or being appeared to by something. 
On Brentano’s view, judging and having a presentation, albeit non-primitive, 
nevertheless stand in a grounding relation to further cognitive notions. While the 
notion of judging plays a central role in Brentano’s analysis of knowing that p, 
his notion of presentation plays a central role in his analysis of understanding 
attitudes. As regards the first point, it is plain that Brentano, in line with Aristotle 
and the Aristotelian tradition, endorses a judgemental account of knowing: 
“Knowledge is to be found in judgement and makes up the perfection of the 
latter”.18 By contrast, Brentano’s account of understanding attitudes is less easy 
to pin down. Yet, in PES, he clearly argues that understanding some linguistic 
expression is best analysed in terms of having some presentations: “When I hear 
and understand a word that names something, I have a presentation of what 
that word designates; and generally speaking the purpose of such words is to 
evoke presentations”.19 
Accordingly, Brentano’s analysis of cognitive attitudes may be summarised 
by means of the following paraphrases, which I shall label B0-B3: 
 
(B0) S has a presentation of A iff S is appeared to by A.20 
(B1) S judges that A iff S has-a-presentation-of-and-accepts A or S has-a-
presentation-of-and-rejects A. 
(B2) S understands a linguistic expression E iff S has a presentation of what is 
meant by E. 
(B3) S knows that p iff (i) S judges that p and (ii) S’s judging that p is self-
evident to S. 
 
No need to say, further analyses might be added to B0-B3. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Brentano 1995b, p. 81, 198, 1956, p. 32. 
18 Brentano Ms. EL 80, p. 12.986(4), 1956, p. 23. 
19 Brentano 1995b, p. 198. 
20 B0 is, so to speak, the “zero level” of cognition, since in Brentano’s eyes “being 
appeared to by A” is noncommittal with respect to A and, therefore, is not truth-
assessable. It is, however, prerequisite for any cognitive attitude directed at A. 
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Brentano’s account provides us with the following answers to our opening 
questions. With respect to Q2, attitudes which are reductively analysed stand on 
the left side of the iff-sign, while phenomenal primitives stand on the right side. 
Therefore, having a presentation, judging and knowing are reducible, non-
primitive notions, while being-appeared-to, acknowledging, rejecting, and self-
evidence are considered phenomenal primitives. With respect to Q1, Brentano 
holds that those distinctions are attitudinal only. Presentation and judgement, for 
example, clearly are “two entirely different ways of being conscious of an 
object”.21 Even though it is tempting to introduce some differences at the level of 
content, such differences are a matter of irrelevance when it comes to analysing 
the related attitudinal concepts. A presentation is a presentation in exactly the 
same sense no matter whether it is a presentation of a simple or complex 
content; and a judgement is a judgement in exactly the same sense no matter 
whether it has a propositional content (p) or a merely nominal content (A). Again, 
the criterion for such attitudinal distinctions is what Brentano will call, later on, 
unilateral separability: even if it is not possible for S to judge that p without 
having a presentation of p, it is possible for S to have a presentation of 
something without judging. As shown in B1, having a presentation of something 
is considered a built-in feature of any judgemental attitude. 
Before turning to Meinong’s own analyses, I want to briefly review some 
difficulties with Brentano’s analyses. One first difficulty (call it Difficulty 2.1) is 
with phenomenal complexity. On B1, judging is not phenomenally simple, but 
phenomenally structured. How are we to conceive of such a phenomenal 
structure? One first option is to say that the new attitude is somehow added to 
the previous one. This interpretation is supported by the claim that judging has 
presenting as a “psychological prerequisite.” Another option is to say that the 
new attitude is a modification of the previous one. This interpretation is 
supported by the thought that S cannot have a presentation of A and accept or 
reject A at the same time. This is what Husserl notices. It seems impossible, 
Husserl argues, to merely have a presentation of something and simultaneously 
judge about exactly the same thing in exactly the same respect. Presentational 
attitude, which is noncommittal, and judgemental attitude, which is committal, 
are incompatible.22 I think this difficulty is a serious one. For the present 
purpose, however, there is no need to settle this issue. We can stay neutral on 
how to best conceive of the phenomenal structure. 
A second difficulty (Difficulty 2.2) is connected to B1. Interestingly, B1 is 
disjunctive: Brentano takes it that judging is either accepting or rejecting. In 
other words, there are “two attitudinal phenomenal features” of judging rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Brentano 1995b, p. 201; Stout 1896, p. 40. 
22 Husserl 2002, p. 110. 
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than one single attitudinal feature of truth-commitment.23 On the face of it, it is 
hard to see how this analysis might provide us with a unified understanding of 
what judging is. Furthermore, it might be objected that acknowledging and 
rejecting are not phenomenal primitives, indeed that various phenomena are 
likely to be understood under those notions, which subsequently require some 
clarification. For example, it may be urged that judging is neither assessing-as-
true nor assenting to a judgement – yet, insofar as those three notions (judging, 
assessing-as-true, assenting to a judgement) are likely to be captured by the 
notion of accepting, the latter turns out to be equivocal (Reinach 1989b; 
Dewalque 2016). The same holds true, a fortiori, with respect to affirming and 
believing, two notions arguably encapsulated within Brentano’s notion of 
acceptance. Therefore, it may be objected that Brentano’s analysis is too 
coarse-grained and that further distinctions are needed. 
A third difficulty (Difficulty 2.3) with Brentano’s account of cognitive attitudes 
has to do with B2 and, more pointedly, with the understanding of a sentence. 
Let us take for granted that understanding a word (e.g., <tree>, <Albornoz 
fortress>) amounts to having a presentation of something, as stated in B2. The 
question arises as to what it is to understand an affirmative or negative sentence 
(<this tree is an oak>, <Albornoz fortress is the highest point of Urbino>). It 
cannot be having a presentation corresponding to each word, for there is no 
presentation for each and every word (e.g., “is”, which is a synsemantical term), 
and it cannot be judging that p, otherwise it would be impossible to understand 
a false proposition without affirming it and thus making an error. Hence the 
question arises as to what kind of attitude is the understanding of a sentence. 
Meinong’s theory of assumption may be seen as an attempt of dealing with 
Difficulties 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
 
3. Meinongian Primitives 
 
It certainly is natural to see Meinong’s treatise on assumptions24 as part of a 
broader project, namely, that of improving Brentano’s classification of mental 
phenomena. Very roughly, Meinong replaces Brentano’s tripartite division by a 
twofold division into cognitive and emotional phenomena, separates 
presentations and thoughts as two subclasses of cognitive phenomena, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Kriegel 2015a, p. 33. 
24 Meinong 1902, 1910, 1977. 
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introduces assumptions as a subclass of thoughts on a par with judgements.25 
Meinong’s classification may be illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
 
Fig. 1. Meinong’s Classification of Mental Phenomena 
 
In his treatise on assumptions, however, Meinong’s goal was not just to 
demonstrate that assumption is a fundamental attitude between presentation 
and judgement. It was to show that the notion of assuming, first, is part of the 
analysans of, and plays the role of a grounding notion for, a number of cognitive 
attitudes, and next, that assuming is a non-primitive attitude which nevertheless 
cannot be analysed in terms of judgement and presentation. Let’s call the first 
aspect the Centrality of assumptive attitudes, and the second one the Specificity 
of assumptive attitudes. 
 
Centrality 
The notion of assuming that p, although it is not itself a phenomenological 
primitive, is implicit in a number of cognitive attitudes, hence is required for the 
descriptive analysis of the latters. 
 
Specificity 
Assuming that p, albeit non-primitive, is a sui generis cognitive attitude which is 
not reducible to having a presentation, judging, or a combination thereof. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For a critical discussion, see Marty 1906. Interestingly, Meinong’s modifications go 
hand in hand with the endorsement of a dichotomy method: Mental phenomena are 
divided into emotional and non-emotional (i.e., cognitive), emotional phenomena are 
divided into passive (feeling) and active (desires), and so are cognitive phenomena 
(presentations are passive, thoughts are active, viz. involve an affirmative or negative 
component). The resulting classification is exposed in Höfler 1894, p. 29 ff., 1930, p. 102 
ff. The method of dichotomous division usually is traced back to Aristotle, who explicitly 
rejected it for biological species, one reason being that dichotomous divisions lead to 
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Centrality implies that it is not possible to adequately describe or analyse a 
number of cognitive experiences (analysanda) without including the notion of 
assuming that p in the analysans. One way of reconstructing Meinong’s 
argument for Centrality is by means of his notion of “objective” (Objektiv) – 
Meinong’s name for a state of affairs. It runs as follows: 
 
P1 If S apprehends an objective, then S judges that p or S assumes that p. 
P2  There are some and, indeed, many states x, y, z, … such as, when S is in 
x, y , z, …, S apprehends an objective and S doesn’t judge that p. 
Therefore,  
C  there are some and, indeed, many states x, y, z, … such as, when S is in x, 
y , z, …, S assumes that p. 
 
Thus reconstructed, the argument is valid. P1 shows a crucial departure from 
Brentano’s analyses. Recall that, for Brentano, the nature of the content 
(whether nominal or propositional) does not put any constraint whatsoever on 
the nature of the related attitude: I can have a presentation of <A>, <A which is 
B> or <A which is not B>. Similarly, I can accept that <A is B> or I can accept 
<A> itself, say, in the case of an existential judgement (“A is”). When it comes to 
determining the attitudinal character of the act, the content of the act is a matter 
of indifference. P1 breaks with this conception by stating that, whenever what is 
apprehended is not a single object, but an objective, the apprehending act must 
be a judgement or an assumption. Meinong’s rationale for adopting P1 runs as 
follows. An objective is a higher-order object (“superiorus”) which is founded 
upon lower-level objects (“inferiora”). Now for founded objects to be 
apprehended, the corresponding thought has to be actively produced by the 
mind. Therefore, apprehending an objective requires some judgemental or 
assumptive activity. I won’t discuss this argument here. Suffice it to note that it 
presupposes the theory of production which has been elaborated on by 
Meinong and some of his heirs.26 
Now Meinong contends that many mental states fall in the scope of P2: 
meaning that p, understanding that p, lying, wondering, etc. All those states 
require one to actively apprehend an objective without judging that p.27 But how 
are we to account for the so-called “activity” involved here? And in what sense, 
exactly, does it differ from judging that p? Meinong’s answer is straightforward: 
it is a convictionless affirmation or negation, and this convictionless affirmation 
or negation precisely is what is called here an assumption. We arrive at this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, e.g., Höfler 1894; Witasek 1908; etc. 
27 Judging is but one kind of “intellectual work” or intellectual “activity” among others. 
See already Höfler 1894, p. 55 ff. 
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notion of assumption, Meinong remarks, when one notices that the notion of 
affirming that p and the notion of being convinced that p do not stand in the 
determinate-determinable relationship. Affirming that p is not a determinate of 
being convinced that p. On the contrary, Meinong argues, it is quite possible for 
a subject S to affirm that p without believing or being convinced that p.28 This 
indeed happens very often. For example when S lies to someone, S affirms 
something she does not believe or denies something she does believe. Similarly, 
Meinong goes on, when S understands (the thought) that p, S does not need to 
believe that p. S merely needs to think that p, where thinking that p is 
tantamount to forming the related affirmation or negation “in a neutral way”, 
namely: without forming the related belief or disbelief. 
We now are in a position to give a rough picture of Meinong’s analysis of 
cognitive attitudes. On Meinong’s view, any nominal content may be 
apprehended by means of an act of presentation, where an act of presentation 
of A is a passive apprehension of A. It is passive in the sense that no production 
of articulated content is involved. By contrast, thinking that p is required for a 
subject S to apprehend the corresponding objective. Now thinking that p comes 
in two forms: either S judges that p, to the effect that S affirms-and-believes that 
p (or denies-and-disbelieves that p), or S assumes that p, to the effect that S 
affirms that p without believing that p (or denies that p without disbelieving that 
p). Accordingly, the ‘affirming’ or ‘denying’ component – or, as Meinong says, 
the yes-no opposition – is common to both judgement and assumption. The 
difference between the two merely is that, in the case of assumption, the belief 
component lacks entirely – or, in some cases, is merely reproduced 
imaginatively.29 To put it differently, Meinong’s analysis rests upon the idea of a 
privative contrast between judgement and assumption: the former does, while 
the latter does not, exhibit a belief component or an “aspect of conviction” 
(Überzeugungsmoment). As a result, Meinong’s analyses suggest that the 
following equivalences are true: 
 
(M0) S has a presentation of A iff S passively apprehends A. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “I would have always thought it obvious that any conviction has to be affirmative or 
negative, but I would have never expected to find affirmation or negation in any case 
where conviction was lacking. That this is neverthless possible and, indeed, anything but 
rare in its realization – this point, along with the consequences of it, constitutes about 
the most important thing to be shown by the following discussions” (Meinong 1910, p. 4, 
1977, p. 4, 1976, p. 11). 
29 Meinong 1968, p. 333. This does not mean, of course, that in assumption an act of 
affirmation is combined with an act of disbelief: rather, the affirmation comes alone, 
without being accompanied by any “conviction” (Überzeugung). An assumption, in 
Meinong’s view, is an affirmation (or a negation) which is disconnected from belief (or 
disbelief). 
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(M1) S thinks that p (or actively apprehends p) iff S judges that p or S assumes 
that p. 
(M2)  S judges that p iff S affirms-and-believes that p or S denies-and-
disbelieves that p. 
(M3)  S assumes that p iff S affirms-without-believing that p or S denies-without-
disbelieving that p. 
 
Moreover, as suggested by Centrality, assuming that p is a necessary ingredient 
of further cognitive attitudes. In Über Annahmen, Meinong mentions at least the 
following cases: 
 
(M4) S means that p iff (i) S utters a sentence expressing p and (ii) S assumes 
that p. 
(M5) S understands that p iff (i) S has a sensory presentation of a sentence 
expressing p and (ii) S assumes that p.30 
(M6) S lies iff (i) S means that p and (ii) S disbelieves that p. 
(M7) S wonders whether p iff (i) S assumes that p and (ii) S desires to know 
whether p. 
 
Let me take stock. Meinong’s list of phenomenological non-primitives includes 
having a presentation, judging, assuming, meaning, understanding, lying, 
wondering, and thinking. His list of phenomenological primitives includes 
passively apprehending, affirming, denying, believing, disbelieving, and uttering. 
Both lists are open. Moreover, like Brentano, Meinong takes it that judging and 
assuming presuppose having a presentation. Unlike Brentano, however, he 
offers a more fine-grained analysis of judging, for he distinguishes between two 
components that are equally present in judging: the affirming or denying 
component, and the belief component (“conviction”). This distinction, it may be 
argued, makes Meinong’s analysis more promising than Brentano’s, indeed puts 
him in a better position when it comes to avoiding Difficulty 2.2. The belief 
component and the assertion component (affirmation or negation) are clearly 
distinguished from one another. 
That said, it is a pending question whether M0-M7 adequately account for the 
phenomena at issue and offer a consistent analysis of cognitive experiences. A 
full-blown critical discussion should probably consider each equivalence (M0-
M7) in turn. However, rather than engaging into detailed case studies, I shall 
confine myself to mention five general difficulties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See also Russell 1910, 1951, p. 159, 2004, p. 209: “When we can suppose that A 
loves B, we ‘understand the proposition’ A loves B. Thus we often understand a 
proposition in cases where we have not enough knowledge to make a judgement”. 
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First of all (Difficulty 3.1), it may be argued, against M3, that assuming does 
not show the kind of attitudinal oppositionality judgemental attitudes exhibit, 
namely a yes-no attitude which has to be distinguished from the contentual 
opposition between p and not-p. If I am not mistaken, there is no sharp 
distinction between an attitudinal and a contentual opposition in Meinong’s 
analyses. Both sides are thought of as closely connected. This ambivalent status 
of affirmation and negation becomes still more obvious in Witasek’s psychology. 
When the content of a judgement is “touched” (berührt) by the affirming or 
denying act, Witasek writes, a “quasi-contentual aspect” (quasi-inhaltliches 
Moment) is added to the overall mental phenomenon, to the effect that the 
content is “complicated with the yes or no”.31 In other words, with the attitudinal 
oppositionality, some oppositionality is introduced in the content of the act of 
judging. Yet, even if one takes this description for granted, it is questionable that 
something similar occurs in the case of assumptions. Are there really negative 
assumptive attitudes? Can you negatively assume that p? Does that even make 
sense? It seems to me that the answer is no. Now if we stick to Brentano’s (and 
Meinong’s) claim that judging is either accepting or rejecting, the absence of 
negative assumptions arguably creates a gap between assuming and judging, 
and speaks for the view that assuming is a non-oppositional attitude like 
presenting or asserting. Just like a negative assertion is the assertion of 
something negative, a negative assumption seems to be best construed as the 
assumption of something negative.32 This is why Russell, for example, leaned 
towards an analysis of assumptions in terms of presentations, for presentations, 
too, are non-assertive attitudes which lack any oppositional character. Be that 
as it may, it is essential to distinguish between contentual similarity and 
attitudinal similarity. Russell write: “The greater likeness of assumptions to 
judgments, we shall conclude, is derived from the identity of their objects and 
the close similarity of their contents; but in regard to the act, assumptions are to 
be classed with presentations, being merely the presentations of objects of a 
certain kind”.33 From a merely attitudinal point of view, assuming that p is neutral 
or noncommittal. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Witasek 1908, p. 281. 
32 After all, this is also what Witasek suggests, willy nilly, when he writes that what 
assuming that p and judging that p have in common is (i) the content <p> and (ii) the 
“quasi-contentual aspect” of affirmation and negation (Witasek 1908, p. 311). My 
proposal is to drop the “quasi-” prefixe and to say that the affirmative or negative aspect 
present in assumption is contentual through and through, to the effect that a negative 
assumption actually is the assumption of something negative – full stop. 
33 Russell 1904, p. 352, my emphasis. Later on, after Meinong’s reply in the second 
edition of Über Annahmen, Russell moved closer to Meinong’s position and agreed that 
assuming or supposing is a sui generis attitude (see Russell 1910, 1951, p. 159, 2004, 
p. 209). 
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A further worry (Difficulty 3.2) is with the incompatibility between assuming 
that p and judging that p. Suppose you are reading and understanding a 
scientific text but have no idea whether what you are reading is true or not. In 
that case, Meinong would say, you are merely assuming the content of the text 
without performing any judgement about it. Then, when you take stance on what 
you have read, you switch from assumption to judgement. In this scenario, the 
assumption just is a preliminary attitude – the attitude of thinking without judging 
– you are forced to adopt as long as you are not in the position of taking stance. 
Now suppose you are asked to consider a counterfactual hypothesis, which you 
know is false. In that case, the situation is different. It is plain that you can 
assume something you take to be false. The case of counterfactual hypotheses 
suggests that S’s assuming that p is compatible with S’s disbelieving that p. For 
instance, you can be asked to assume that <2 + 2 = 5> even if you know (judge 
with self-evidence) that it is false, hence reject it. Now, on Meinong’s analysis, 
the situation would be this: S assumes, that is affirms-without-believing that p 
and S judges to be false, that is, denies-and-disbelieves that p. Thus, S affirms 
and denies the same propositional content at the same time in the same 
respect. Now affirming that p and denying that p are incompatible, indeed 
contradictory attitudes. Therefore, this way of understanding assumptions fails 
to account for the compatibility between assuming and judging.34 
It might be replied that this objection does not take into account the fact that 
Meinong replaced Brentano’s notions of acceptance/rejection by the notions of 
affirming/denying. The latters presumably refer to a mere attitudinal component 
(not per se a full-blown attitude), which might also be characterised as 
positing/non-positing something. Now it may be argued that positing/non-
positing p is quite compatible with the acceptance/rejection of p, to the effect 
that the compatibility problem just vanishes. There is no incompatibility between 
rejecting-as-incorrect that <2+2=5> and assuming or positing-without-believing 
that <2+2=5>. The case for Meinong’s analysis is neatly put by Sébastien 
Richard: “It is indeed impossible to accept and reject the same matter at the 
same time and in the same respect, but assumption is not so much about 
acceptance and rejection than position – the putting of a case”.35 
One way of putting this idea is to conceive of the phenomenal structure of 
judgements and assumptions in terms of modification, rather than in terms of 
addition: the affirmation (resp., negation) is modified by the presence or absence 
of belief component, to the effect that the word “affirmation” does not denote 
the same attitudinal component in judging that p and assuming that p. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Marty 1906, p. 21–23. 
35 Richard 2017, p. 233. The idea that assuming is best understood as das Setzen eines 
Falles may be traced back to Frege 1891, p. 21. See also Meinong 1977, p. 6, fn. 1. 
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it is far from being clear whether this move really enables Meinong to resist the 
objection. The problem comes from the fact that Meinong precisely conceives of 
the positing/non-positing as a common ingredient in judgement and 
assumption. This common affirmative or negative component, which is 
supposed to be present both in assumption and in judgement, is the source of a 
serious difficulty, for it blocks any attempt of understanding “affirming” in two 
different ways.36 A negative judgement that p is supposed to be an act of 
denying-and-disbelieving that p, while an affirmative assumption that p is 
supposed to be an act of affirming-without-believing that p, and the two clearly 
seem mutually exclusive. Again, this suggests that a more neutral attitude than 
the yes-no attitude is needed if we are to account for such a compatibility. 
A similar issue (Difficulty 3.3.) is raised as soon as one has to deal with 
multiple assumptions. The situation is described by Brentano in the 1911 
appendix to PES: “As Meinong uses [the notion of assumption or supposition], 
we could often suppose two contradictory things at the same time, as for 
example when we say, ‘Locke says that Descartes is mistaken in teaching that 
there are innate ideas.’ For in this case we would be supposing that someone is 
mistaken when he teaches that there are innate ideas, and supposing that there 
are innate ideas, all at the same time”.37 The only way out would be to 
acknowledge still another sui generis attitude which would be to the assumption 
what the assumption is to the judgement. I won’t say more about that, although 
this difficulty is maybe less peripheral than it may seem at first sight. 
A fourth difficulty (Difficulty 3.4) is tied to what I shall call the problem of 
converse separability. Contrary to what Meinong wrotes, it may be objected that 
affirming-without-believing that p is impossible. The idea would be this. 
Meinong’s account takes the phenomenology of affirming wrong, for “every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Note that this already was the core of Marty’s famous objection against Specificity – 
an objection which employs Aristotle’s and Brentano’s method of aporia. Marty’s 
argument runs as follows (Marty 1906, 1908, p. 245): 1) there are only two ways of 
understanding assumptions as sui generis attitudes: either assumptions and judgements 
are different genera of mental attitudes or they are species of the same genus; 2) if 
assumptions and judgements share the same affirmative or negative component, then 
they cannot possibly be different genera; now 3) they share the same affirmative or 
negative component (according to Meinong); therefore, 4) they cannot possibly be 
different genera; 5) if the only difference between them is that assumptions lack of belief 
component, then they cannot be different species of the same genus, for different 
species are distinguished from one another by a positive rather than a merely privative 
contrast; now 6) the only difference between assumptions and judgements (according to 
Meinong) is that assumptions lack of belief component; therefore, 7) they cannot be 
different species of the same genus; hence 8) none of the ways of understanding 
assumptions as sui generis attitudes works. For a more thorough reconstruction of the 
Marty-Meinong controversy, see Richard 2017. 
37 Brentano 1995b, p. 285. 
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affirmation rests upon a conviction”38 while “a conviction may exist without any 
affirmation”.39 For example, on Reinach’s account, it seems that a lie doesn’t 
involve an affirmation properly speaking, but only an apparent or modified 
affirmation: at the psychological level, the liar doesn’t affirm anything, he merely 
simulates an affirmation. The same might be said of the actor who is playing a 
role on the theater stage. On Meinong’s view, the actor makes affirmations 
which are assumptions: he affirms-without-believing, for example, that he is King 
Lear. The question at issue is whether this affirmation is an affirmation in the 
plain sense of the term. My suggestion is that it is best understood as a 
simulated affirmation. But a simulated affirmation is not an affirmation, for 
“simulated” is here used in a modifying way (in Brentano’s sense). If this 
suggestion is correct, then, pace Meinong, an assumption is not and cannot be 
an actual affirmation. It is only the appearance of an affirmation. 
Eventually (Difficulty 3.5), it may be objected that Meinong’s analyses, by 
relying on Centrality, fail to account for a number of descriptive or 
phenomenological differences. For example, it may be argued that there is some 
phenomenological difference between assuming in the sense of testing a 
hypothesis and understanding – disregarding the fact that, in the case of 
understanding, one hears or reads a sentence. For one part, when one performs 
an assumption in order to reach a certain conclusion, the overall 
phenomenology arguably involves some interest or conative ingredient, to the 
effect that one desires to reach a conclusion. Whether a similar conative 
ingredient is integral to the understanding experience is questionable. Moreover, 
it is true that, in order to understand a sentence, I don’t have to perform a 
judgement; otherwise, we couldn’t understand a sentence that we judge to be 
false. Understanding that p is not judging that p. Yet, setting aside Meinong’s 
argument, which conceives of assuming as a way of producing some articulated 
content, is there any objective reason to analyse understanding that p in terms 
of assuming that p? On the face of it, understanding is not the same as 
assuming. Again, it seems that further distinctions are needed to do justice to 
the variety of cognitive attitudes.40 
It seems to me that Difficulties 2.1-2.5 derive from a common source, namely: 
the claim (M3) that assuming that p is best analysed in terms of affirming that p 
or denying that p, as if an assumption would be but an incomplete judgement, a 
judgement lacking the belief component. We have seen how Meinong arrived at 
this analysis. The equivalences offered in M0-M3 are not introduced “under the 
pressure of the phenomena”, so to speak. Rather, they are motivated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Reinach 1989b, p. 125. 
39 Reinach 1989a, p. 425. 
40 Richard 2017, p. 236–37. 
	   18	  
Meinong’s view that there must be some activity involved in the apprehension of 
a higher-order object. Even if one agrees with this last claim, however, thinking 
of this apprehension as constitutively made up of an affirmative or negative 
attitudinal component common to judging and assuming proves highly 
problematic, for an affirmative or negative attitudinal component necessarily is 
committal – or it is not attitudinal after all, but merely contentual. Again, it is hard 
to see how the notions of affirming and denying might be understood in a both 
attitudinal and noncommittal sense. One main moral to be drawn from all that 
precisely is that assuming that p cannot be construed as a committal attitude 
like judging that p. 
To finish, I want now to sketch an alternative analysis. Drawing on 
suggestions made by Broad and – more recently – Kriegel, my proposal is to 
take entertaining that p as a phenomenological primitive besides affirming that p. 
 
 
4. Entertaining as a Phenomenological Primitive 
 
Some authors have suggested that at least some assumptive experiences were 
to be analysed in terms of entertaining that p, to the effect that entertaining 
should be considered a phenomenological primitive. As far is I know, this 
suggestion first emerged in a review of Meinong’s treatise on assumptions 
written by Stout’s assistant, Charlie Broad. Broad writes:  
 
I cannot help thinking that there are really three different attitudes towards a 
proposition and that Meinong confounds two of them under the name Annahme. 
These two I would distinguish as supposition and entertainment. It seems to me 
that entertainment clearly differs from supposition and is presupposed both by it 
and by judgement. When Meinong insists on the resemblance of Annahmen to 
judgement I think he has suppositions in mind; when he says that every judgement 
presupposed a corresponding Annahme I think he has entertainment in mind. But 
entertainment as distinct from supposition does not seem to me to differ from 
having an idea.41 
 
Similarly, Twardowski, like Brentano, uses the notion of presentation and insists 
that what is presented when one understands a sentence is the judgement 
expressed by the sentence: 
 
When someone maintains that Descartes lived in the 15th century, I perfectly 
understand this sentence; yet, since I take it that the judgement “Descartes lived in 
the 15th century” is false, it is plain that I cannot perform it. Here, therefore, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Broad 1913, p. 92. 
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understanding of the sentence rests quite obviously on the presenting of the 
judgement denoted by the sentence; performing the judgement thus proves quite 
irrelevant for the understanding of the sentence.42 
 
To this, Meinong would naturally object that an act of judging cannot properly 
speaking be the object of a presentation: “Am I at all able to think of X’s 
judgement that A is not B, if I do not in the first place somehow think that A is 
not B?”.43 Still, even if we grant that some thinking is required here, nothing 
forces us to endorse (M1) Meinong’s analysis of thinking in terms of judging or 
assuming, let alone (M3) his analysis of assuming in terms of affirming or 
denying. My own suggestion is that, from a merely attitudinal point of view, a 
more neutral attitude will do. This is precisely what is offered by Broad’s analysis 
in terms of entertaining. 
More recently, Uriah Kriegel proposed a similar analysis. He suggested that 
entertaining could be conceived of as a phenomenological primitive not unlike 
Brentano’s neutral Vorstellen. Importantly, entertaining is an attitude which 
admits of a number of modifications. I can entertain a proposition in order to 
decide whether I should believe it or not. But I can also entertain something in a 
way which is “purely contemplative” and “with no doxastic business in mind”.44 
This attitudinal distinction, Kriegel suggests, may be captured by distinguishing 
between considering and contemplating. Used in a technical sense, considering 
and contemplating are modifications of entertaining: 
 
(K1) S considers p iff (i) S entertains that p and (ii) S has the project of figuring 
out whether p. 
(K2)  S contemplates p iff (i) S entertains that p and (ii) S does not have the 
project of figuring out whether p. 
 
Importantly, those subtle variations do not alter the neutrality which is 
constitutive of the phenomenology of entertaining. As Kriegel puts it, 
“entertaining is doxastically neutral on the truth (and goodness) of p when 
performed both in an engaged and in a disengaged mode”.45  
On the face of it, K1 is close to assuming or “supposing.” In the case of 
“supposing”, however, there is a crucial difference: 
 
Sometimes we entertain that p not because we want to know whether p, but 
because we want to know whether q, that is, we are interested in the plausibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Twardowski 2017, p. 150. 
43 Meinong 1910, p. 118–19, 1977, p. 118–19, 1976, p. 88. 
44 Kriegel 2013a, p. 5, 2015b, p. 112. 
45 Kriegel 2013a, p. 6. 
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some proposition, and our process for figuring out the plausibility of that 
proposition involves entertaining that p. This seems to be what happens when we 
suppose that p.46  
 
Accordingly, assuming or supposing that p would be best analysed as follows: 
 
(K3) S supposes that p iff (i) S entertains that p and (ii) S wants to know what is 
inferable from p. 
 
To be sure, this analysis leaves a number of questions open. It is an open 
question, for example, whether entertaining that p is a common component 
present in any cognitive attitude (judging that p, believing that p, and the like). 
For the present purpose, however, suffice it to say that, on the proposed 
analysis, assuming (or supposing) that p does not involve affirming that p or 
denying that p as phenomal components. I take it that this is a crucial departure 
from Meinong’s analysis. This is not to say, of course, that affirming that p and 
denying that p are not phenomenological primitives. Yet, they are not part of the 
analysans of assuming that p.  
My own feeling is that such an alternative analysis avoids the above-
mentioned difficulties. It avoids Difficulty 2.1, since it does not force assumptive 
attitudes into the yes-no opposition. It also avoids Difficulty 2.2, for it makes 
assumptive attitudes compatible with judgemental attitudes that are directed at 
the same objective in the same respect. Disregarding the entertaining 
component they might well be sharing, assuming that p and judging that p are 
different attitudes altogether. Similarly, it seems to me that the analysis in terms 
of entertaining prevents the problem of multiple assumptions (Difficulty 2.3) – as 
well as that of converse separability (Difficulty 2.4) – of arising in the first place. 
Consider, again, the following sentence: “Locke says that Descartes is mistaken 
in teaching that there are innate ideas.” Since, on Meinong’s analysis, 
understanding that p involves assuming that p, anyone who understands this 
sentence would have to assume (affirm-without-believing) that there are innate 
ideas and to assume (affirm-without-believing) that accepting the existence of 
innate ideas is a mistake. The two affirmations are hardly compatible with one 
another. If, on the contrary, understanding that p is analysed in terms of 
entertaining that p, there is no clash of affirmations involved in the 
understanding of the above-mentioned sentence. Entertaining that p being a 
noncommittal attitude, there is no contradiction in entertaining (the thought) that 
there are innate ideas and entertaining (the thought) that the theory of innate 
ideas is mistaken at the same time. Last but not least, the analysis in terms of 
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entertaining and modifications thereof places us in the position of accounting for 
fine-grained attitudinal distinctions, including the distinctions between 





I have argued that Meinong’s analysis of assumption fails to adequately account 
for the noncommittal character of the latter. One main advantage of the 
alternative approach in terms of entertaining is that, with the above-sketched 
distinctions in hand, we might be able to avoid Difficulties 2.1-2.4 and to 
account for some interesting descriptive differences touched upon in Difficulty 
2.5. Another interesting consequence is that the discrimination of entertaining 
attitudes implies the reference to some epistemic goals, as obvious from K1-K3. 
As already suggested by M7, wondering whether p involves the desire of 
knowing whether p. This suggests that a full-blown analysis of cognitive 
attitudes should posit conative attitudes as part of the analysans (wanting, 
having the project of, etc.). Thus, exploring the connections between cognitive 
and conative attitudes would be a further route of enquiry.47 
 
Arnaud Dewalque 
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